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Canada is a country where anniversary 
celebrations play a large role in maintaining 
the historical consciousness of the people. The 
women's movement has not escaped this 
phenomenon. Thus , in 1979, the country wit-
nessed the spawning of numerous projects, 
conferences and articles celebrating the fiftieth 
anniversary of the "persons case" decision. 
Judg ing from the attention that it received, the 
obvious conclusion would be that the case 
represented a significant step in the evolution 
of women's rights in Canada as well as an i m -
portant development in Canadian legal 
history. 
The central focus of discussions of the case 
has been the fact that, incredulous as it might 
seem, Canadian women, until 1929, were not 
legally considered to be "persons ." But , like 
most historical events, context is a key in un-
derstanding the whole story. This paper 
focuses on two interacting forces that place the 
"persons" case in the broader framework of 
Canadian constitutional and legal history. It 
examines the historical development of the per-
sons issue in Canada and illustrates the un-
derlying theme of Senate reform and judic ia l 
mandate that influenced the final outcome. By 
treating the subject in this manner, it becomes 
apparent that the "persons" case, although i n -
teresting as an issue in legal history, does not 
represent the major breakthrough that the at-
tention it received in 1979 would have us 
believe. 
In Canada the "persons" problem had a 
relatively short, albeit volatile, career. It first 
became an issue in 1916, shortly after E m i l y 
M u r p h y was appointed Police Magistrate for 
the newly created Women ' s Cour t of E d -
monton . 1 Al though she had no formal legal 
training, members of her family in Ontar io 
were firmly associated with that calling. H e r 
brother W i l l i a m Ferguson, for example, 
became a Judge in that province in 1916. 2 H e r 
cousin H o w a r d Ferguson, who became the 
Conservative Premier of Ontar io in 1923, also 
practised law prior to embarking upon his 
political career. 3 Accord ing to her biographer, 
M u r p h y had received an excellent education 
and had often discussed the law with her father 
and brothers. As soon as she was appointed 
Police Magistrate, she made good use of her 
past experiences and set out to correct existing 
deficiencies in her legal knowledge. 4 
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The appointment had made M u r p h y the 
first woman Magistrate in the British Empire . 
However, this distinction did not prevent her 
from having difficulties. 5 O n her first day in 
court, an Edmonton defense lawyer objected to 
her presence on the bench on the grounds that 
she was not eligible to hold the office because of 
her sex. The comment was also made that this 
was based on a long-standing interpretation of 
the word "pe r son" and how it applied to 
eligibility for public office. 6 Al though the 
remark had no effect upon the outcome of the 
trial , it had a profound impact upon 
Magistrate M u r p h y . The lawyer's comment 
whetted her interest and she began to in-
vestigate the implications of what he had said. 
T o her surprise and consternation, she found 
that women under Brit ish C o m m o n L a w 7 were 
only considered to be persons in "the matter of 
pains and penalties, but not in the matter of 
rights and pr iv i leges ." 8 
Even though the same point was brought up 
numerous times in her courtroom, nothing 
came of the matter until Al ice Jamieson was 
appointed Police Magistrate for the Women 's 
Cour t of Calgary. She too encountered the 
"pe r son" arguments that E m i l y M u r p h y had 
faced. This state of affairs existed until 1918, 
when, in an appeal arising from the Calgary 
court, the Honourable M r . Justice Scott of the 
Supreme Cour t of Alberta ruled that as far as 
that province was concerned, "there was at 
common law no legal disqualification for 
holding public office arising from any distinc-
tion of s e x . " 9 O f course, this Judge's decision 
had little influence upon the interpretation of 
"pe r son" i n other parts of Canada because 
provincial legal decisions carry almost no 
weight when they represent new explanations 
of long-standing precedents such as the "per-
sons" interpretation. 
Whereas the Alberta decision can be seen as 
a defensive action, in that it was aimed at 
maintaining the rights of women to hold 
positions in the judic iary , other activities of a 
more aggressive nature aimed at gaining ad-
ditional privileges for women were taking place 
in the D o m i n i o n . In 1919, partly as a response 
to a heightened sense of political awareness 
resulting from successes in the suffrage 
struggle and partly as a result of vacancies in 
the Senate, the Federated Women ' s Institutes 
of Canada and the Nat ional Counc i l of 
W o m e n petitioned the federal government to 
have a woman appointed to the Upper House. 
The argument used by the petitioners was that 
since the Senate considered legislation that af-
fected women and children, it was only right 
that women should be represented so as to 
safeguard their interests in that H o u s e . 1 0 
In a sense the women were correct in using 
this argument. The function of the Senate is to 
oversee the activities of the House of C o m -
mons, thereby guaranteeing that the elected 
representatives do not get carried away with 
spontaneous, ill-considered legislation promot-
ed by vote-getting, crowd-pleasing rhetoric 
and motives. In order to carry out this mult i -
faceted duty, Senators have a designated term 
of appointment and thus, theoretically, are 
above the petty squabblings and intrigues of 
the House of Commons polit ician. Further, all 
pieces of federal legislation must be approved 
by the Senate before becoming law. 
Significantly, however, Senators are appointed 
to represent a region of the country, not a class 
or group of people . 1 1 Therefore, the notion 
that there should be women Senators to protect 
the interests of Canadian women could be 
challenged as being at odds with the actual 
functions and duties of Senators. 1 2 
Although the arguments presented by the 
petitioners for the admission of women to the 
Senate had considerable merit, the request was 
denied. The basis of this refusal was not the 
"Tightness" of women's representation in the 
Senate, but rather, the constitutional i n -
terpretation of the word "persons" as it per-
tained to qualifying for the Senate . 1 3 N o doubt 
this pronouncement came as a surprise to 
many Canadian women who had never 
questioned the possibility that they were not 
persons. 
Fo r the next five years considerable activity 
was focused on the question of the eligibili ty of 
women to sit in the Senate. In January 1921, 
the secretary of the Mont rea l Women ' s C l u b 
wrote to E m i l y M u r p h y asking i f she would 
allow her name to be put forward as that club's 
nominee for the Senate. 1 4 In M a y of the same 
year, Nellie M c C l u n g wrote to Senator W . H . 
Sharper 
The only objection that any person can 
have to M r s . M u r p h y for the Senate is 
that she is a women. She can qualify in a 
dozen different ways, each one of them 
far beyond the qualifications of the 
average Senator. She is a writer, a lec-
turer, a public-minded cit izen, a leader 
among women, a woman of open mind 
and generous heart, who has done much 
to bring about better conditions in 
Canada . She is recognized as an 
authority in matters of law, and above a l l , 
she is our choice at this time. M e n and 
women all over Canada , east, west, north 
and south, are asking for her ap-
pointment . 1 5 
It is important to note that this was an era 
when mounting crit icism was being leveled at 
the very existence of the Senate. The 
Progressive Party had as one of its planks the 
abolition of the R e d Chamber and throughout 
the 1920s numerous speakers rose in the House 
of Commons suggesting either the abolition or 
the reform of the Senate. Indeed, the Grain 
Growers' Guide, the leading reform organ for the 
prairies, noted with dismay in September 
1921, that a delegation of women had pressed 
Pr ime Minis ter Meighen for the appointment 
of E m i l y M u r p h y to the Senate. The editorial 
did not oppose women in the Senate but 
rather, it objected to the very existence of that 
Chamber. It stated: 
It does not look well , to say the least, to 
see women, directly they become en-
franchised, playing the game just as the 
men played it and hunting for special 
favors and privileges presumably as the 
price of their votes. A non-elected Senate 
is an anachronism; it should have no 
place in a democracy and as nobody ever 
knows what goes on in the Senate or cares 
to read the speeches of Senators, M r s . 
M u r p h y would only waste her time and 
eloquence in that chamber. She should 
get out and tell the people what reforms 
she wants to see established and i f they 
approve she wi l l have no difficulty in per-
suading them to send her to the proper 
place for the enactment of the required 
legislation—the House of C o m m o n s . 1 6 
The controversy over the Senate culmi-
nated, in 1927, in a constitutional conference 
between the nine provinces and the federal 
government to discuss various proposals to 
reform the upper house. Significantly, the 
issue of women's eligibility to the Senate was 
not mentioned at this gathering. In fact, few 
references can be found in either the House of 
Commons debates or the Senate debates which 
even mentioned this reform. There was one 
notable exception. This occurred in 1921 when 
the Government Member of Parliament for 
Kindersley, M r Meyers , proposed that along 
with other reforms to the Senate, "the right of 
sitting in the Senate should be also accorded to 
w o m e n . " H e argued that since the govern-
ment had 
. . . extended the suffrage to women and 
they are now entitled to sit in this C h a m -
ber as well as in the Provincial 
Legislatures, I see no reason why they 
should not be enabled to sit in the Upper 
Chamber of this Par l iament . 1 7 
Meyers ' proposal was not taken up by the 
Meighen government. This lack of action is 
understandable because the Meighen govern-
ment was ushered out of office in that year. 
Moreover , M a c K e n z i e K i n g ' s minor i ty 
government which succeeded to office, was de-
pendent upon the Progressive Party for sur-
v iva l . G i v e n that Party's assault on the Senate 
as an outmoded and restrictive encumbrance 
to a truly democratic Canada, K i n g felt it 
prudent not to move too quickly on the issue. 
Government inaction did not deter women 
from seeking equal rights of representation. 
The cry for a woman Senator was raised by a 
vocal minori ty whenever a vacancy became 
available. But even within the ranks of the 
dedicated few, there were problems of par-
tisanship and dissension. E m i l y M u r p h y noted 
in a letter to Nell ie M c C l u n g : 
I had letter from M r s . John Scott today. 
She says that the Mont rea l Women 's 
C l u b would not send a resolution to the 
Conservative Convent ion at W p g . / sic/ 
because it was a Conservative C o n -
vention, and the majority of the Montrea l 
C l u b were Liberals. Vice Versa, the 
women at W p g . gave two reasons for not 
asking the Conservative Convention to go 
on record. (1) The men didn't want it; (2) 
they were not going to work for anything 
that might end in M a r y Ellen Smith being 
appointed. 1 8 
Understandably, M u r p h y ' s reaction to this 
situation was less than generous as she berated 
these groups for being "small-hearted, stupid, 
selfish and graceless." 1 9 The dreams of the 
previous decade that women would inject a 
purer, nonpartisan outlook into politics, by 
1927 was shown in many ways to be false. 
Besides marking the end of the first decade 
of enfranchisement for the five westernmost 
provinces, 1927 was an important date regard-
ing the whole "persons" question. Accord ing 
to her biographer, it was in the early part of 
that year that Emi ly M u r p h y ' s brother, 
W i l l i a m , a prominent Ontar io lawyer who had 
been appointed to the bench of the First A p -
pellate Div i s ion of the Supreme Cour t of O n -
tario in 1916, informed her about a little 
known section of the federal Supreme Cour t 
A c t . 2 0 T h i s section allowed interested persons, 
appealing as a unit, to ask for the in -
terpretation of a constitutional point raised un-
der the B N A A c t . If the Department of Justice 
agreed that the question was of sufficient 
public importance, it would then be referred by 
the Governor-General- in-Counci l to the 
Supreme Cour t for a r u l i n g . 2 1 This revelation 
reputedly set M u r p h y furiously casting about 
for suitable "interested Persons," finally 
deciding that Henrietta ( M u i r ) Edwards, 
Nell ie M c C l u n g , Louise M c K i n n e y and Irene 
Parlby should be her co-appellants. 2 2 In a letter 
to Nellie M c C l u n g on August 5, 1927, she 
urged: 
I do not feel it even remotely necessary to 
urge upon you the extreme desireability 
of your lending your much valued in-
fluence to this matter which is so closely 
allied with the political, social and philan-
thropic interests of al l Canad ian 
w o m e n . 2 3 
Thus was set in motion the most important 
constitutional debate concerning women's 
rights in Canada since their D o m i n i o n en-
franchisement in 1918. 
The five petitioners, being fully aware of the 
failure of previous attempts at having women 
appointed to the Senate, deemed it advisable to 
avoid all reference to the term "persons" in 
the questions submitted to the Supreme Cour t . 
Thus , the final wording of the three questions 
that were presented for consideration dealt 
with the two themes of the constitutional 
ability of the federal government to both ap-
point women to the Senate and, failing that, to 
amend the statutes governing admission to the 
Senate. The questions read as follows: 
1. Is power vested in the Governor-
General of Canada , or the Parliament of 
Canada , or either of them, to appoint a 
female to the Senate of Canada? 
2. Is it constitutionally possible for the 
Parliament of Canada , under the 
provisions of the Brit ish Nor th Amer i ca 
Ac t , or otherwise, to make provision for 
the appointment of a female to the Senate 
of Canada? 
3. If any statute be necessary to qualify a 
female to sit in the Senate of Canada , 
must this statute be enacted by the Im-
perial parliament, or does power lie with 
the Parliament of Canada , or the Senate 
of C a n a d a ? 2 4 
These questions were forwarded to the 
Min is te r of Justice. In response to them the 
federal Cabinet decided that the "question 
whether the word 'Persons' in said section 24 
includes female persons is one of great public 
importance." Thus , " o n the recommendation 
of the Min is te r of Jus t i ce" the following 
question was forwarded to the Governor-
General for submission to the Supreme Cour t . 
Does the word "Pe r sons" i n section 24 o f 
the Bri t ish Nor th Amer i ca Ac t , 1867, i n -
clude female persons? 2 5 
The discrepancy between the questions sub-
mitted to the Minis ter of Justice by the 
petitioners and the final form of the question 
forwarded to the Supreme Court provoked an 
immediate and vehement response from E m i l y 
M u r p h y . In her reply to the letter from the 
Cle rk of the Pr ivy Counc i l of November 2, 
1927, she wrote: 
W e respectfully beg to point out that the 
question referred to the Supreme Cour t 
. . . is not the one submitted by your 
petitioners either in word or in meaning 
and is, in consequence, a matter of 
amazement and perturbation to us . . . . 
In framing their questions on con-
stitution, your petitioners were not un-
mindful of the fact that the officers of the 
C r o w n had already expressed the opinion 
publically, and to various delegations, 
that a female was not a "pe r son" under 
the B . N . A . Act and, for this, and other 
very excellent reasons, refrained from 
using the word "pe r son" in any of our 
questions. W e , therefore, reiterate that 
the citation as forwarded to the Supreme 
Cour t of Canada by your Order- in-
Counc i l is not our question, nor a correct 
interpretation thereof, and that ac-
cordingly it requires to be w i t h d r a w n . 2 6 
In connection with her concern about the 
wording of the actual questions put before the 
Supreme Cour t , M u r p h y was also worried 
"about the uncertainty that prevails under 
Canada 's ' a u t o n o m y ' . " 2 7 Th is uncertainty 
had considerable bearing upon any remedial 
legislation brought into existence i f the 
Supreme Cour t ruled against the petitioners. 
Al though the sections of the B N A Ac t govern-
ing the composition of the House of Commons 
could be changed by the D o m i n i o n 
Parliament, the sections dealing with the selec-
tion of Senators could not. Instead, agreement 
of both Houses of Parliament as well as 
unanimous agreement of the provinces was 
required before a petition to the British 
Parliament regarding a change in these sec-
tions of the B N A Act could be made. As was 
pointed out in an editorial in the Manitoba Free 
Press: 
The H o n . H . Ferguson is reported to 
have said that he is all for women but he 
cannot bear to see the B . N . A . Act tam-
pered with, and i f such drastic action 
must be taken before the R e d Chamber 
opens its gilded doors to women, he 
would favour them being reserved as at 
present for a men's o w n . 2 8 
The questionable ability of the House of C o m -
mons to pass legislation enabling women to sit 
in the Senate and the vocal resistance of men 
like Premier Ferguson of Ontario to 
" t amper ing" with the B N A Act represent two 
very poignant reasons for E m i l y M u r p h y ' s 
reservations. It is interesting to note that 
Ferguson's biographer, P . N . Ol iver , has ob-
served that: 
when federal politicians . . . talked of new 
procedures for constitutional amend-
ment, Ferguson sprang forward to defend 
the status quo; when the same politicians 
suggested that the Supreme Court of 
Canada replace the P r ivy Counc i l as the 
final court of appeal, Ferguson muttered 
of veiled treason to the E m p i r e . 2 9 
Moreover , the fact that women in Quebec still 
d id not have the right to vote in the 1920s 
meant that Ottawa could expect little en-
thusiasm from that province on the question of 
constitutional reform to give women access to 
the Senate. 3 0 
It must be remembered also that there still 
existed considerable misgivings about the very 
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existence of the Senate. Al though, by 1928 the 
force of the Progressive Party was largely 
spent, reform of the Senate was still a potent 
issue. J . S . Woodswor th , the prominent 
Labour Member of Parliament for Winnipeg 
Nor th Centre, was one critic who periodically 
rose in the House of Commons blasting the 
government over the undemocratic nature of 
the Senate. 3 1 Obviously , K i n g ' s government 
had more than the Conservative Premier of 
Ontar io to consider. 
W i t h these potential problems as a backdrop 
for constitutional reform, the careful phrasing 
of the questions presented by the petitioners 
comes into sharper relief. They knew what 
they were up against; i f it was found that the 
B N A Ac t had to be amended i n order to admit 
women to the Senate, then the measure would 
face a great deal of resistance and inevitably 
get bogged down i n partisan polit ical squab-
bles and questions of principle other than the 
status of w o m e n . 3 2 The women had selected 
N . W . Rowe l l , one of the top constitutional 
lawyers in the country, to argue their case. 
Rowel l was sympathetic to the issue and since 
he was a prominent L ibera l it could not be 
charged that the decision was influenced by 
nefarious political considerations. 3 3 N o r was 
the cost of the procedure a problem. O w i n g to 
the wording of subsection 5 of section 55 of the 
Supreme Cour t Ac t (which provides that "the 
reasonable expenses" of arguing the case 
might be paid by the Min i s t e r of Justice out of 
any moneys appropriated by Parliament for 
expenses of l i t iga t ion 3 4 ) , the women d id not 
even have to worry about legal fees. Thus there 
was little that the petitioners could do but await 
the Cour t ' s decision. 
It was not unti l A p r i l 24, 1928, that the 
Supreme Cour t o f Canada handed down its 
judgement on the question, "Does the word 
'Persons' in section 24 of the Br i t i sh Nor th 
A m e r i c a Ac t , 1867, include female per-
s o n s ? " 3 5 It was unanimously agreed by 
Justices A n g l i n , Duff, Mignau l t , Lamont and 
Smith that: 
W o m e n are not 'qualified persons' within 
the meaning of section 24 of the B . N . A . 
A c t , 1867, and therefore are not eligible 
for appointment by the Governor 
General to the Senate of C a n a d a . 3 6 
Although this judgement may have disap-
pointed many, it was not a surprising decision 
when one examines the rationale used by the 
Justices and understands the scope of the 
Supreme Cour t at that time. A foremost con-
sideration was that, i n 1928, the Supreme 
Cour t was not the final court of appeal. Fur-
thermore, its traditional role was not that of in -
novator, in that it d id not have the jud ic ia l 
mandate, due mainly to historical practise, to 
overturn strongly established precedents. 
Another equally strong basis for the Cour t ' s 
decision was the relative weight that they allot-
ted to the word "persons ." They found i n 
examining the sections of the B N A Act dealing 
with the selection and appointment of Senators 
that the word "persons" was always used in 
conjunction with either "qua l i f i ed" or "fi t and 
qual i f ied ." O n the basis of this they decided 
that the question which had to be answered was 
"whether 'female persons' are qualified to be 
summoned to the Sena te . " 3 7 T o the layman 
these distinctions appear to be irrelevant 
semantic problems but in the judgement that 
followed these distinctions play an important 
role. 
H a v i n g established the exact question to be 
answered by the court, the Justices proceeded 
to weigh the various arguments put forward by 
the litigants. T h e key argument used by 
Lucien Cannon , solicitor general in K i n g ' s 
government, against the petitioners was based 
upon the case of Chorlton v. Lings which was 
heard before the Brit ish Cour t of C o m m o n 
Pleas in 1867. Th i s precedent setting 
judgement determined that: 
Consider ing that there is no evidence of 
women ever having voted for members of 
parliament in cities or boroughs, and that 
they have been deemed for centuries to be 
legally incapable of so doing, one would 
have expected that the Legislature, i f 
desirous of making an alteration so i m -
portant and extensive as to admit them to 
the franchise, would have said so plainly 
and d is t inc t ly . 3 8 
Furthermore, this argument was supported 
by more recent decisions which lent con-
siderable strength to the case against the 
petitioners. In 1922, for example, Viscount 
Birkenhead, L . C . , in rejecting the claim of 
Viscountess Rhondda to sit in the Bri t ish 
House o f Lords stated: 
It is sufficient to say that the Legislature 
i n dealing with this matter cannot be 
taken to have departed from the usage of 
centuries or to have employed such loose 
and ambiguous words to carry out so 
momentous a revolution in the con-
stitution of this House. A n d I am content 
to base my judgement on this a lone . 3 9 
N . W . Rowel l , in his plea for the petitioners, 
contended that there were sections of the B N A 
Act where the word "persons" was obviously 
used to include the more general meaning, i n -
cluding women as well as m e n . 4 0 Further, he 
invoked the aid of the statutory interpretation 
provisions in force in England in 1867 known 
as L o r d Brougham's Ac t—which read: 
Be it enacted that i n al l Acts words i m -
porting the Masculine Gender shall be 
deemed and taken to include Females, 
and the Singular to include the P lu ra l , 
and the Plural the Singular, unless the 
contrary as to Gender or Number is ex-
pressly p rov ided . 4 1 
Rowel l ' s strategy in adopting these 
arguments were threefold. First , by stressing 
the fact that there were instances in the con-
struction of the B N A Act where the word ' 'per-
sons" obviously included women, it is ap-
parent that he was attempting to undermine 
the precedent of Chorlton v. Lings. A l o n g these 
same lines Rowel l was also attempting to 
establish as historical fact that women were 
considered to be persons when the A c t was 
framed in 1867. Final ly , by using L o r d 
Brougham's Act , he hoped that, since no 
specified gender was "expressly p rov ided" for 
in the sections of the B N A Ac t dealing with the 
Senate, the Justices would leniently interpret 
the word "persons" to include both men and 
women. 
In the opening remarks to his judgement, 
C h i e f Justice A n g l i n stated: 
In considering this matter we are, of 
course, in no wise concerned with the 
desirability or the undesirability of the 
presence of women in the Senate, nor 
with any political aspect of the question 
submitted. O u r whole duty is to construe, 
to the best of our abili ty, the relevant 
provisions of the B . N . A . A c t , 1867, and 
upon that construction to base our an-
swer . 4 2 
Furthermore, he added that i f "the phrase 
'qualified persons' in section 24 includes 
women today, it has so included them since 
1 8 6 7 . " 4 3 These pronouncements are par-
ticularly important because they indicate the 
court 's predeliction to remain wi th in the strict 
confines of the law and the precedents that had 
arisen to that point. Th is court certainly was 
not about to make any radical reinterpretations 
of the Brit ish Nor th Amer i ca A c t . Rather, they 
strove to establish the original intent of the 
framers of the legislation without regard for 
changing social and political consequences. 
Rowell ' s contention that "persons" in other 
sections of the B N A Act included women was 
forcefully argued. But it floundered on the 
point that "persons" i n these instances was not 
used in conjunction with either "qua l i f i ed" or 
"f i t and qual i f ied" , thus running aground on 
Ang l in ' s precondition that females must be 
" q u a l i f i e d " or "fi t and qual i f ied" persons. 
L ikewi se , R o w e l l ' s reference to L o r d 
Brougham's Act was quashed by A n g l i n , who 
pointed out that " 'persons' is not a 'word i m -
porting the masculine gender.' Therefore, ex 
facie, L o r d Brougham's Act has ho application 
to i t . " 4 4 Since these were the key arguments 
presented for the petitioners their dismissal by 
the Justices helps to explain the final outcome 
of the hearing. 
Regardless of the strengths and weaknesses 
of the petitioners' case, the court 's predis-
position for legal precedent and historical fact, 
explains the ultimate decision. Justice Duf f 
stated: 
. . . it is sometimes the duty of a court of 
law to resort, not only to other provisions 
of the enactment itself, but to the state of 
the law at the time the enactment was 
passed, and to the history, especially the 
legislative history, of the subjects with 
which the enactment dea ls . 4 5 
B y their interpretation of the pertinent sections 
of the B N A Act the court made it clear that 
they believed that women had not been in -
cluded by the framers of the Act in 1867. The 
judgement of the court was based on the belief 
that had the legislators intended that women be 
included in the group of " q u a l i f i e d " persons 
there would have been an explicit reference i n -
dicating what would have been a revolutionary 
break with legislative tradit ion. T h e historic 
Chorlton v. Lings case cited as an argument 
against the petitioners was used as the legal 
basis for this decision. This was clearly stated 
by C h i e f Justice A n g l i n i n his closing remarks: 
In our opinion Chor l ton v. Lings is con-
clusive against the petitioners alike on the 
question of the common law incapacity of 
women to exercise such public functions 
as those of a member of the Senate of 
Canada and on that of their being ex-
pressly excluded from the class of 
"qualif ied persons" within section 24 of 
the B N A Act by the terms in which sec-
tion 23 is couched, so mat L o r d 
Brougham's Act cannot be invoked to ex-
tend those terms to br ing " w o m e n " 
within their purview. 
W e are, for these reasons, of the 
opinion that women are not eligible for 
appointment by the Governor General to 
the Senate of C a n a d a . 4 6 
This judgement received a mixed press in 
English Canada. A Manitoba Free Press editorial 
perhaps best expressed the prevailing sen-
timent i n government circles. The main focus 
of the editorial was upon the "unexpected i m -
plications (that) may arise from the Supreme 
Cour t r u l i n g . " 4 7 The editorial raised the 
possibility that women were not eligible to sit 
i n the various provincial legislatures and in the 
House of Commons . It continued by exploring 
the ramifications of having to ask women 
already sitting in Canadian legislatures to 
vacate their seats. Th is situation was treated 
satirically by the author and the implications 
were that few would seriously consider such an 
interpretation. The problem of how to make 
women eligible for the Senate, however, was 
treated with all seriousness. It was pointed out 
that: 
What we wil l have to do now is to obtain 
an amendment to the B . N . A . A c t . 
Canada, of course, has no power to 
change the Ac t ; we w i l l have to ask the 
Bri t ish government to do it for us. The 
House of Commons wi l l have to move, 
the Senate wi l l have to approve, the 
provinces, we suppose, wi l l have to be 
consulted, and i f one of them object we 
have the word of M r . Cahan of Mont rea l , 
M r . Ferguson of Toronto , and other 
more or less legal minds that the Brit ish 
government wi l l sit tight and refuse to lift 
a finger to help the women of C a n a d a . 4 8 
Judg ing from the tone of the editorial it was 
these latter consequences of the "persons" case 
that presented the "unexpected implicat ions" 
to which the author referred. 
Whi le the press mulled over the implications 
of the Supreme Cour t decision, an immediate 
reaction was forthcoming from the federal 
government. In response to a question from 
M r . A . W . N e i l l , the Independent Member of 
P a r l i a m e n t from C o m o x - A l b e r n i , the 
Honourable Ernest Lapointe, Minis ter of 
Justice replied: 
. . . In view of this judgement, and in 
view of the fact that women in this coun-
try now have an equal franchise with 
men, and in view of the further fact that 
one of the seats in this house is occupied 
by a woman, the government have 
decided that they should have the equal 
right to sit in the other chamber, and 
means wi l l be taken to secure an amend-
ment to the Brit ish Nor th Amer ica Act in 
that respect. 4 9 
Although no one questioned Lapointe's sin-
cerity, his promise to find the means to place 
women in the Senate provoked considerable 
debate. The main issue was the questionable 
ability of the House of Commons to pass b in-
ding legislation which would fulfill his 
promise. 
The question of women's eligibility in the 
Senate became embroiled i n the much broader 
issue of federal sovereignty i n matters of con-
stitutional reform and, as such, it was used as a 
political football by politicians seeking to em-
barrass Mackenzie K i n g ' s Libera l govern-
ment. Th i s opportunism is best illustrated by 
an exchange between R . B . Bennett and W . L . 
Mackenzie K i n g in the House of Commons on 
June 11,1928. 
M r . Bennett: . . . W e are not a sovereign 
power even for domestic purposes, and I 
can best illustrate that statement by a 
reference to one house of this parliament. 
The Supreme Cour t of Canada has 
decided that women may not be ap-
pointed to the Senate, and we have not 
the power to change our constitution in 
that regard. That must be done by an 
amendment to the B . N . A . A c t . 
M r . M a c K e n z i e K i n g : It is a matter of 
method, that is al l ; the power comes from 
us. 
M r . Bennett: N o , the legislative power is 
exercised at Westminister, not at Ottawa 
50 
M a n y political observers agreed with Ben-
nett and believed that Lapointe would not be 
able to follow through on his pledge. 5 1 Th is 
group included E m i l y M u r p h y . O n M a y 2, 
1928, only eight days after the judgement of 
the Supreme Cour t had been passed down, 
E m i l y M u r p h y sent copies of an appeal to the 
Jud ic ia l Committee of the P r ivy Counc i l Q C -
P C ) to the other appellants. Al though she was 
cautious about cri t icizing Lapointe 's promise 
it was made clear that she distrusted the 
politics involved in amendments to the B N A 
A c t . She stated: 
Be it understood that this appeal must not 
be construed as in anywise expressing a 
lack of confidence in the determination of 
the Honourable , the Min i s t e r of Justice 
and his colleagues of the Cabinet to devise 
means whereby the B N A Act may be 
amended to permit of women sitting in 
the Senate of Canada , but only that we, 
as Petitioners, can have no certainty that 
the exigencies of politics or the dissent of 
one or more of the Provinces may not 
preclude the possibility of such amend-
men t . 5 2 
Bearing in mind Premier Ferguson's fear of 
federal " t a m p e r i n g " with the B N A Act and 
Premier Taschereau's oppostion to female en-
francisement, 5 3 M u r p h y ' s reservations about 
the "exigencies of pol i t ics" and the "dissent" 
of a Province was not without a basis in fact. In 
August of the same year M u r p h y wrote to 
Nell ie M c C l u n g commenting upon the federal 
government's willingness to pay for the costs of 
the appeal to the J C P C . "Apparen t ly , no 
means have been 'devised' else they would not 
be wi l l ing to pay the costs of a p p e a l , " 5 4 she 
concluded. The comment that followed 
illustrates M u r p h y ' s clear grasp of the realities 
of Canad ian politics and of the problems of 
constitutional reform i n this country: 
It is well though that it has turned out this 
way for i f a woman or women had been 
appointed through " m e a n s " Quebec 
would have l ikely appealed against it, so 
we may as well get it settled now so far as 
the legal end is concerned. 5 5 
Although M u r p h y expressed a great deal of 
confidence in the ultimate success of the appeal 
the first arguments heard by the J C P C were 
not delivered unti l J u l y 22, 1929, nearly fifteen 
months after the Supreme Cour t dec i s ion . 5 6 
But the long wait was not in va in , for oh O c -
tober 18, 1929, L o r d Sankey of the J C P C an-
nounced: 
The i r Lordships are of the opinion that 
the word "persons" in section 24 does in -
clude women, and that women are 
eligible to be summoned to and become 
members of the Senate of C a n a d a . 5 7 
One would think that in order for such a 
decision to be reached, especially in light of the 
unanimous rul ing of the Supreme Cour t of 
Canada , new and conclusive evidence had 
been introduced to sway the Pr ivy Counci l ' s 
decision. But, surprisingly enough, no 
dramatic new arguments were put forward by 
either side. A n important factor in the J C P C 
decision was the historic mandate of the two 
courts. O n the one hand the Supreme Cour t of 
Canada held a secondary position in the 
Canadian judicia l hierarchy as compared with 
that of the J C P C . Further, the lesser court had 
traditionally exercised a relatively l imited role 
in initiating new and overturning old 
precedents. The J C P C , on the other hand, 
represented the final court of appeal in the 
Dominion ' s legal system. This position 
coupled with the immunity of J C P C judges 
from Canadian political changes allowed the 
J C P C to have greater scope in reinterpreting 
past legislation and, as evidenced by its 
numerous rulings on issues of federal-
provincial powers, the court used this function 
freely. 5 8 
Related to the varying mandates of the two 
courts was the weight placed upon the 
historical arguments used in the previous 
hearing. In passing down the judgement L o r d 
Sankey noted: 
The exclusion of women from all public 
offices is a relic of days more barbarous 
than ours, but it must be remembered 
that the necessity of the times often forced 
on man customs which in later years were 
not necessary . . . . The fact that no 
woman had served or has claimed to serve 
such an office is not of great weight when 
it is remembered that custom would have 
prevented the claim being made, or the 
point being contested. Customs are apt to 
develop into traditions which are stronger 
than law and remain unchallenged long 
after the reason for them has disappeared. 
T h e appeal to history therefore in this 
particular matter is not conclus ive . 5 9 
A n issue i n the appeal judgement which af-
fected the outcome was the willingness of the 
Pr ivy Counc i l to be influenced and directed by 
modern political and social developments. 
This particular stance was a complete reversal 
of that taken by the Canadian Supreme Cour t . 
In their judgement the P r ivy Counc i l ruled 
that they d id "not think it right to apply rigidly 
to Canada of to-day" the customs and 
reasonings used in other centuries and in other 
countr ies . 6 0 Furthermore, they were deter-
mined not to restrict the B N A Act to a 
' 'narrow and technical construction, but rather 
to give it a large and liberal interpretation so 
that the Domin ion . . . may be mistress in her 
own house . " 6 1 In light of the changing 
relationship between B r i t a i n and her 
Dominions , destined to be formalized by the 
Statute of Westminister in 1931, the impact of 
the altering political and social realities un-
doubtedly played a very substantial role in the 
final J C P C rul ing of 1929. 
A Canadian Press interview that appeared 
in the Vancouver Province quoted the following 
optimistic remarks made by E m i l y M u r p h y 
about the results of the appeal. 
. . . that the members of the Judic ia l 
Committee of the P r ivy Counc i l have 
given a wider and more favourable in -
terpretation of the word "persons" than 
that of the Supreme Cour t of Canada , is a 
matter of much gratification to myself 
and my co-appellants in Alber ta . The 
same is applicable to all the women of 
Canada , whom we have had the pleasure 
to represent in the long and somewhat ar-
duous struggle for full political r ights . 6 2 
A n d on paper it d id appear that the J C P C 
rul ing had heralded a new day for the political 
equality of men and women in Canada . But 
this was not the case in the cold realities of 
Canadian politics. 
Al though the first woman Senator was ap-
pointed within months of the J C P C rul ing , the 
general trend has been to overlook women 
when Senatorial vacancies have come up. In-
deed, the pattern for these few appointments 
has been to provide token plums to loyal party 
workers by the party in power at Ottawa. 
Thus , the first woman Senator in Canada was 
not E m i l y M u r p h y , whose strong family ties 
with the Central Canad ian Conservative 
establishment eliminated her from con-
sideration by the Mackenzie K i n g Liberals . 
Rather this honor was bestowed upon Cai r ine 
Wi l son whose activities as a former president 
of the Women ' s L ibera l Federation allowed 
K i n g to extend a seat in the Senate to a Libera l 
o f impeccable , though uncont rovers ia l , 
qualif ications. 6 3 
Furthermore, Senators and politicians 
generally did not accept the view that women 
had special interests that must be represented 
in the Upper House. Th is point was brought 
home graphically by Senator L i a r d of Saskat-
chewan in response to a comment made by 
Cair ine Wi l son in her maiden speech to the 
Senate. L i a r d stated: 
. . . she/Wilson/claimed to be "the 
representative of the women of C a n a d a " 
in this Chamber . . . may I point out that 
our fair colleague is hardly correct in so 
designating herself. She is a Senator from 
the Province of Ontar io , and is one of the 
representatives in this Chamber of all the 
people of Ontar io , men, women and 
children. She stands in a position no dif-
ferent from that of any other member of 
this House: no one of us represents any 
particular class, creed or sex, but each 
member is here to speak for all the 
people . 6 4 
Unfortunately, M u r p h y ' s ideal of " f u l l 
political r ights" for women is as much of a 
dream today, over fifty years after the J C P C 
ru l ing as it was in 1929. Al though the "per-
sons" case is particularly interesting for the 
constitutional and judic ia l problems that it 
contains, it represents a mere splinter in an 
almost impregnable wall of restrictions that 
prevent to this day women's complete equality 
in Canadian society. 
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